#### Hostile environments and profiling IS the status quo ---- the American “Predator Empire” operates under the framework of presumptive guilt, refusing to delineate the distinction between livelihoods of individuals and their “personalities” --- this exemplifies an unaccountable politics of purity that can cast its power, both inclusion and exclusion, to communities abroad and at home

Shaw 2013 (Ian G. R. Shaw, Professor of Human Geography at the University of Glasgow, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare”, Geopolitics, DOI:10.1080/14650045.2012, 2013)

The Double Tap

The debate over whether or not drone strikes are a “success” is usually focused on their ability to target and eliminate “militants”. This technological enframing fails to consider what everyday life is

like for the broader populations that live under the drones53**.** Two recent publications are noteworthy in this respect: a 2010 report headed by Christopher Rogers of CIVIC 54, which interviewed over 160 Pakistani Civilians suffering direct losses from the U.S. strikes, and an extensive 2012 report released by The Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and the Global Justice Clinic at the New York University School of Law 55, which interviewed 130 people, including victims, witnesses, and other experts. Both reports provide firsthand testimony by those civilian populations living on the fleshy side of the disposition matrix.

Stanford and NYU’s report has four main findings. First, civilians are routinely killed, often in so-called “double tap” strikes that kill anyone that tends to the dead and wounded in the wake of an attack. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism claims that at least 50 civilians and “first responders” had been killed after they rushed to help victims of drone strikes 56. One interviewee, Hayatullah Ayoub Khan, recounted a particularly harrowing experience57. A drone missile was fired at a car around 300 meters in front of him while driving. Hayatullah exited his vehicle and slowly approached the wreckage, cautious that he might be a victim of a follow-up strike. He walked close enough to the car to see a flailing arm inside. The injured occupant “yelled that he should leave immediately because another missile would likely strike”. Hayatullah did as instructed, returning to his car just as a second missile struck the survivor. The second finding from Stanford and NYU is that beyond direct physical and monetary damage, the constant hovering of drones has lead to a deeply entrenched psychological malaise amongst civilians. Many community members now shy away from social gatherings, including important tribal meetings and funerals, with some parents even electing to keep their children away from school. Third, there is scant evidence that the strikes have made the U.S. “safer”. The “evidence suggests that US strikes have facilitated recruitment to violent non-state armed groups, and motivated further violent attacks”58. Finally, the CIA’s program of targeted killings undermines respect for, and adherence to, international law and sets a dangerous precedent.

The death of innocent people is a common theme among interviewees in both reports. CIVIC interviewed Guy Nawaz, a resident of North Waziristan who was watering his fields when he heard the screech and boom of a Hellfire: “I rushed to my house when I heard the blast. When I arrived I saw my house and my brother’s house completely destroyed and all at home were dead”59. Eleven of his family were killed, including his wife, two sons and two daughters, as well as his older brother, his wife and four children. He continued, “We were living a happy life and I didn’t have any links with the Taliban. My family members were innocent... I wonder, why was I victimized?”60 Safia lost her 30 year-old husband and 7 year-old son when a militant vehicle was struck by a drone as it passed her house. She said that “I hope the Taliban are all killed. But I hope the drone attacks are stopped immediately. They are not effective against the Taliban hideouts. USA and Pakistan should realize the fact that for the last 5-6 years the drone attacks have been taking place but no Taliban has left extremism or terrorism”61. Stories of emotional and psychological trauma were frequently recounted in both reports, with medical professionals diagnosing the “anticipatory anxiety” and “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” (PTSD) many civilians now suffer with. As Safdar Dawar, President of the Tribal Union of Journalists explains 62:

If I am walking in the market, I have this fear that maybe the person walking next to me is going to be a target of the drone. If I’m shopping, I’m really careful and scared. If I’m standing on the road and there is a car parked next to me, I never know if that is going to be the target. Maybe they will target the car in front of me or behind me. Even in mosques, if we’re praying, we’re worried that maybe one person who is standing with us praying is wanted. So, wherever we are, we have this fear of drones.

Both reports are an important challenge to the legitimization of drone warfare, especially in light of recent figures by a Washington Post-ABC News poll that found 83 percent of those Americans surveyed “approve” of the use of drones against suspected terrorists overseas63. The near-impossibility of travel to FATA by journalists and researchers outside or inside of Pakistan means that these reports give a rare glimpse of life on the ground. These shared stories of the women, children, and men of FATA “disturbs and disrupts the hegemonic foreign policy gaze”64, and refocuses the lens of the White House’s geographical imagination. Drone warfare in Pakistan, just like the “war on terror” more generally, is not a universal experience65: it is differentially distributed and violently uneven, split between suburban pilots that sit in air-conditioned trailers and scan video screens, adjusting their “soda straw” digital view of the world with a joystick, and the everyday experiences told by the people of FATA. While not wanting to overstate the case, these stories are important for rehumanising the abstract discourses of security strategy and the bureaucratic spaces of the disposition matrix. The Predator Empire The Biopolitics of the Predator Empire In this section I explore how “life” is the target for the Predator Empire. Although I do not want to downplay the role the American military plays in coordinating and performing violence across the globe, my focus is on the CIA’s drone wars because the evidence from the NSC and DSG suggests a diffuse (if by no means singular) drift towards the dronification of national security. So too does the National Counterterrorism Center’s disposition matrix and John Brennan’s “playbook”66 establish a permanent precedent for extrajudicial strikes that exist outside of Title 10 authorities67. This means that the CIA will in all likelihood remain heavily invested in targeted killings for decades to come, despite 9/11 Commission recommendations that paramilitary activities are transferred to the Department of Defense 68. The agency’s 2,000-strong Counterterrorist Center has transformed itself from an intelligence gathering machine to a major player in “kinetic operations”69. But who counts as a “target” is at times ambiguous. As I previously explored in the above NSS and NSC, there is a deliberate widening of the net surrounding who counts as an affiliate. If, as Dillon and Reid suggest, “The history of security is a history of the changing problematisation of what it is to be a political subject and politically subject”70, then the discursive baptism of the affiliate marks a new, if not unprecedented political subject. This is further complicated because affiliate are not always identifiable individuals such as an al-Qa’ida leader in North Waziristan. Instead, and as I will argue in the remainder of this section, affiliates can be threatening patterns of life that are coded, catalogued, and eliminated.

As the name directly implies, targeted killings usually involve a known target. In February 2011, John Rizzo, the 63-year-old former General Counsel of the CIA, discussed the agency’s practice of targeted killings71. Analysts and ‘targeters’ located in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center select individuals for “neutralization” based on intelligence reports. This report must then clear a team of lawyers before it signed off by the Counsel. But this isn’t always the normal bureaucratic practice. In the summer of 2008, former CIA Director Michael Hayden successfully lobbied President Bush to dispense with drone targeting constraints that were restricted to known individuals72: “For the first time the CIA no longer had to identify its target by name; now the ‘signature’ of a typical al Qaeda motorcade, or of a group entering a known al Qaeda safe house, was enough to authorize a strike”73. The devil here is in the detail. Unlike “personality strikes”, where the person’s identity is located on one of the CIA’s classified kill lists or the disposition matrix, a signature is constructed from observing and cataloguing a pattern of life—coding the behavior and geography of individuals; targeting their very lifeworld. This new targeting regime may have led to a rapid escalation of drone strikes and an increase of the number of people that were killed in Pakistan. Between 2004 and 2007 there were 10 drone attacks, but between the pivot year of 2008 and 2012, this figure leapt to 333 74. In Table 1, I have calculated the percentages of militant “leaders” killed in drone strikes in order to illustrate the decreasing number of high-level “commanders” that are subject to the CIA’s strikes. While this in itself does not prove that personality strikes have given way to signature killings, it does at least suggest the widening net of those subject to drone attacks in Pakistan.

To illustrate how easily innocent civilians can get caught up in a signature strike, recall the 2010 CIVIC report once again. In one story, the Taliban visited the residence of a man named Daud Khan and demanded lunch. The father reluctantly consented, fearing reprisal if he refused the fighters: “The very next day our house was hit... My only son Khaliq was killed. I saw his body, completely burned”. In this case, it seems that Khan’s son had unwittingly become “affiliated” with the Taliban. Due to the unavoidable intermingling of such militants with the lives of ordinary people, it is likely that signature strikes could have killed many innocent people. According to the 2012 Stanford and NYU report, a signature strike probably place on March 17, 2011. The CIA fired at least two missiles into a large gathering—a jirga led by a decorated public servant—near a bus depot in the town of Datta Khel, North Waziristan. The U.S. insists that all were militants. And yet, the overwhelming evidence suggests that most of the 42 people killed were civilians 75. Of the four suspected Taliban militants identified by the Associated Press in this strike, only one has ever been identified by name. As a 2011 Washington Post report notes, “Independent information about who the CIA kills in signature strikes in Pakistan is scarce”76. Other officials in the U.S. State Department have complained that the classified criteria used by the CIA to construct a “signature” are too lax: “The joke was that when the CIA sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ the agency thinks it’s a terrorist training camp”77.

Table 1 about here Table 2 about here

Of course, drones continue to target known individuals on kill lists, performing a well-rehearsed “reduction of places and people to an abstract space”78, but at least since 2008 the Predator Empire has enforced a distinctive twist on a biopolitical logic based on targeting patterns of life. While there is much variation on what counts as biopolitics79, it was a term first coined by Michel Foucault in Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France80, a series that Chris Philo describes as the “decisive hinge” in Foucault’s “switch from being a critical historian of the body to being the critical historian of population”81. In classical theories of sovereignty, the sovereign can “either have people put to death or let them live’ 82, and its power over life “is exercised only when the sovereign can kill”83. This sovereign power became supplemented by a new “right to make live and let die”84 in the nineteenth-century. This transformation involved a shift from disciplinary technologies that targeted “man-as-body” (what Foucault calls an “anatomo-politics”) to regulatory mechanisms at the level of “man-as-species” (what Foucault calls a “biopolitics”). Biological processes such as fertility rates became political problems and sites of intervention, where the aim is was to “establish a sort of homeostasis”85 within the population which “consists in making live and letting die” and “achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers”86. All of might be termed “State control of the biological”87.

Dillon and Reid88 extend Foucault’s biopolitics of the population to a biopolitics of the molecular. They argue that as the life sciences changed over the last century, so too did the “bios” of biopolitics, becoming ever more processual, spontaneous, and based on codes (such as DNA). This “recombinant biopolitics” fed directly into the visions of Rumsfeld’s “Revolution in Military Affairs” to create a new organizing principle “concerned with surveillance and the accumulation and analysis of data concerning behaviour, the patterns which behaviour displays and the profiling of individuals within the population”89. Under this new metaphysics of power, in which “power/knowledge is very much more concerned to establish profiles, patterns and probabilities” 90, information is a weapon and securing territory is no longer viewed with the same importance as securing patterns of life. For Foucault, this means that dangerousness, what is to be secured, is no longer an actualized danger, but is located within behavioral potentialities. Or as Bruce Braun suggests, “Today, security’s principal answer to the problem of ‘unknown unknowns’ is the speculative act of pre-emption, which takes as its target potential rather than actual risks”91. Consequently, dangerous signatures or patterns of life are assessed on their very potential to become dangerous.

In the tribal areas of Pakistan, for example, most people killed by U.S. drones have not been al-Qa’ida fighters. In fact, the number of al-Qa’ida militants eliminated has been just 8% under the Obama administration92. This means that a far greater number of people who played no part in the attacks of September 11, 2001 have been vaporized by Hellfire missiles. Former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, went so far as to question whether “killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in response to [events] in 2001”93. The presumptive “guilt” of many of those killed in Pakistan today is thus constructed around the so-called “immanent” threat they pose to the U.S. Homeland: a pre-emptive, future-oriented biopolitics that exists in an exceptional space outside of centuries of international humanitarian law. These Pakistani “affiliates”—which include the Pakistan Taliban and Haqqani Network members, are part of a much wider expansion of who count as affiliates in a globalizing drone war.

The very condition that makes a biopolitics possible in the first place then—life—has become a force to be coded and secured. As Dillon describes it, “The biopolitics of security today is precisely this political emergency of emergence instituting a regime of exception grounded in the endless calibration of the infinite number of ways in which the very circulation of life threatens life rather than some existential friend/enemy distinction”94. The appearance of the affiliate in the NSS and NSC marks the emergence of a far more process-based, even epidemiological understanding of danger, where the “threat” is located in what individuals could become in the future, and security is defined as anticipating and eliminating the emergence of such danger. For Dillon, this erasure of the concept of “man” by targeting “life” means that “it is no longer adequate to judge lifelike bodies in terms of the essence of that existential otherness definite of the enemy alone, for every-body is a continuously emergent body-in-formation comprised of contingently adaptive rather than fixed properties”95. The “evental”96 nature of this “emergent emergency” helps explains the conditions surrounding the CIA’s shift in targeting practices from personality strikes to signature strikes and the changing object of national security from al-Qa’ida the organization to al-Qa’ida affiliates. In both cases the targets for the Predator Empire are not simply actualized forms of danger, but virtualized forms of emergence that may become threats in the future97.

The Spatial Topology of the Predator Empire

According to research by Nick Turse, the U.S. military operates 1,100 bases across the planet98. Many of these sites exist in shadow because they are used for paramilitary operations by Special Forces and the CIA. These bases range in size and location, but a recent and favored strategy of the U.S. military has been to construct skeletal “lily pads” that are scattered in remote outposts across the globe. Chalmers Johnson, author of the book Blowback, wrote back in 2004 that “[t]his vast network of American bases on every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire – an empire of bases with its own geography not likely to be taught in any high school geography class”99. While this “new form of empire” has been growing for decades, the proliferation of remotely piloted aircraft certainly marks a new phase in its evolution—the Predator Empire. Everywhere and nowhere, drones have become sovereign tools of life and death, where with “the lives and deaths of subjects become rights only as a result of the will of the sovereign”100.

The Predator Empire is underpinned by an expanding geography of drone bases in and around the “areas of concern” mentioned in the NSS and NSC. There are now at least 60 bases used for U.S. military and CIA drones—from medium sized Predators and Reapers to experimental systems such as the “Sentinel” that was captured by Iran. As part of their surveillance of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Mali, U.S. drones have flown out of Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Seychelles, Niger, and many more 101. These geographic locations are intended to develop overlapping circles of surveillance. The jewel in the crown in this new form of empire is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which is sandwiched between Somalia and Yemen. This secretive 500-acre base is the first ever camp dedicated solely to tracking and eliminating al-Qa’ida and its “affiliates”102. Around 16 drones either take off or land every day at the base, which has its origins as an outpost in the French Foreign Legion. Activities at Camp Lemonnier increased in 2010 after 8 Predators were delivered, turning the camp into a fully-fledged drone base. The CIA first shipped its Predators to the camp in 2002 103, and it now acts in collaboration with the secretive Joint Special Operations Command. A total of 3,200 U.S. troops, civilians, and contractors are assigned to the camp where they “train foreign militaries, gather intelligence and dole out humanitarian aid across East Africa as part of a campaign to prevent extremists from taking root”104. In short, Camp Lemonnier is the concrete symbol of a Predator Empire no longer bound to Pakistan or Afghanistan, and expanding across the Africa.

But despite this concrete presence, the CIA’s fleet of secret drones has little interest in securing “territory” in the traditional sense, seeking instead to secure and eliminate patterns of life that threaten. In Security, Territory, Population105 Foucault details how biopower is not exercised across territory per se 106, but through spaces of circulation or a “milieu” of human and nonhuman multiplicities that constitute life-in-the-making. Similarly he wrote that the last domain of biopolitics is “control over relations between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are living beings, and their environment, the milieu in which they live”107. Here, Foucault refers to both natural and manmade environments, where mastery of the environment is translated into mastery of the population. Sloterdijk goes so far as to state that “The 20th century will be remembered as the period whose decisive idea consisted in targeting not the body of the enemy, but his environment”108. Indeed, securing the atmosphere has continually transformed understandings of space, power, and sovereignty 109. The question is therefore how is the environment a biopolitical target for the Predator Empire? How is the environment understood and controlled? Unlike forms of environmental intervention that leave a gigantic “footprint” in the soil of the earth, such as the counterinsurgency pursued in Iraq, the Predator Empire pursues a different kind of spatial biopolitics; a virtual intervention where what is captured is not “hearts and minds” but endless streams of information that are broadcast back to the Homeland. This suggests that the direction of power is not just an outward projection—as with the geographic expansionism that traditionally defines “American power projection” across the globe. Rather, it also suggests an inward power collection: defined here as the power to incorporate, to bring closer. The drone continues to transform U.S. biopower by bringing distant “areas of concern” such as the tribal areas of Pakistan into the gaze of pilots, targeters, and analysts in Creetch Air Force Base in Nevada. This power to make the faraway intimate is “a non-symmetrical power topology which sometimes coincides with a geographically materialized power topology and sometimes does not”110. Predators “fold” space with an unparalleled level of aeromobility, reducing the importance that geographic distance and obstacles have in separating “there” from “here”. This power topology is not strictly exercised across space then, but rather, it is the capacity to crumple an environment by digitizing it. As Allen states, “The use of real-time technologies to create a simultaneous presence in a diversity of settings is, for instance, just one way in which relations of presence and absence may be reconfigured so that the gap between ‘here and there’ is bridged relationally, and distance itself is no longer understood simply as a metric”111. The 2012 DSG makes it clear that physical boots on the ground are not part of the strategic environment of the future. The Predator Empire therefore marks the continuing evolution from a reliance on a topographic, ground-intensive empire to a topological, aerial empire. Airpower and aeromobilities has always been a central tenet of U.S. military strategy of course. As Adey summarizes, “From the air raids of the Blitz to the newest unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, aeromobilities provide both promise and possibility, as well as dread, terror, destruction and death’112. And while it is undeniable that the CIA’s ghost war requires an expanding network of drone bases, such a Droneworld is not the end point of power—it is the architecture for the coding, cataloging, and eliminating of life in “real time”, on a scale that is historically unprecedented. It is within the unique topological spatiality of the Predator Empire that targeting killings become ever more decentralized across the planet, even as the power to take life is centralized in the hands of the executive branch of government.

When Obama stated that “We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense” in his inaugural address, he appealed to a biopolitics that is the hallmark of our geopolitical condition. The distinctiveness and coherence of “friend” and “enemy” has seemingly melted away into more amorphous patterns of life that are located across Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. Although Foucault goes to create lengths detailing how biological life is included in politics, and how technologies exist “to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass”113, he also asks how ‘is it possible for a political power to kill, to call for deaths, to demand deaths, to give the order to kill...? 114 He answers quite specifically with racism as “the precondition for exercising the right to kill”115. Certainly, the Pashtun residents in the tribal areas of Pakistan are caught in a net of violent colonial language116 and laws117 inherited from the British Raj. But such violence must constantly be performed and is thus reliant on the technologies and spatialities of state power 118. The civilians living and dying in Pakistan, whose families and friends were interviewed in the 2010 CIVIC report and the 2012 Stanford and New York University report, are exposed to an unaccountable surveillance apparatus that scrutinizes their patterns of life from thousands of miles away. Their vulnerability is inseparable from the topological spatial power of the Predator Empire.

#### Conner and I take a position that there should be restrictions on the United States committing targeted killings

#### There is always a necessity to work on the self --- and that method is anti-thetical to patting oneself on their back, and in the context of the topic the affirmative is necessary to bring to discussion debates that happen in closed doors and is “a noise that few listen to” ---- our affirmative is a form of informing an increasingly disconnected public about the spread of drones to law enforcement

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Conclusions

By introducing the term Predator Empire I do not want to suggest that U.S. extrajudicial killings are in any way “new”. Rather, I want to show how U.S. national security strategy is transforming alongside the rise of the drone; creating the geopolitical conditions for a permanent war waged from the heart of Washington D.C. The Predator, manufactured by General Atomics, was the first drone used by the U.S. for a targeted killing in Afghanistan in 2002. Since then, the CIA’s model of extrajudicial assassination has moved from the periphery to the center of a dronified form of state violence. This is a battle that is spearheaded by bureaucrats and White House officials that wear suits rather than uniforms, and wage war with spreadsheets rather than rifles. It is a different kind of empire, one in which U.S. bases resemble outposts like Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. This shift is encapsulated in the 2011 National Counterterrorism Strategy and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. These documents mobilize an amorphous “everywhere war”119 against vaguely defined “affiliates”. Of course, the “war on terror” has always been a type of governmentality 120 that inserts itself into the population, whether at airports, borders 121, or other security checkpoints, where biometric scanning segregates “legitimate mobilities” from “illegitimate mobilities”122. The CIA’s signature strikes extend and rework this form of algorithmic calculation to target threatening patterns of life. And this is realized by a topological power that folds the spaces of the affiliate into the surveillance machinery of the Homeland.

The Predator Empire thus marks the continuation of biopolitics by other means—namely an aerial ghost war that is central to U.S. national security. These targeted killings represent the crystallization of what could be called America’s “one percent war”: a war that only affects around one percent of the U.S. population: those profiting in the military-industrial complex and those pilots sitting in cubicles staring at “Death TV”. The other 99 percent remain alienated from a nebulous and permanent war waged by robots in the borderlands of the planet. This has the effect of creating two geographic and imaginary distances: between drone pilots and their targets, and between the Predator Empire and the public. And with so much of the violence performed by the CIA’s paramilitary wing, an official [refusal to acknowledge] ~~silence~~ drowns out any murmurings that surface in an otherwise subdued Congress. So too does the replacement of human troops with robotic warriors reduce the threshold of going to war. Beginning on April 23rd, 2011, American drones began six months of strikes against Qaddafi’s faltering regime in Libya. Crucially they were not authorized by the so-called Congressional “War Powers Resolution” designed to curb executive power. Peter Singer writes that “Choosing to make the operation [robotic] ~~unmanned~~ proved critical to initiating it without Congressional authorization”, adding “Like it or not, the new standard we’ve established ... is that presidents need to seek approval only for operations that send people into harm’s way — not for those that involve waging war by other means”125.

Looking forward, the consequences of this dronification of state violence are only coming into focus, although I think three outcomes are almost certain. First of all, consider “drone creep”: the use of drones in everyday settings by the police and other civilian agencies. One of the biggest trends in recent years has been the adoption of drone technology for law enforcement, particularly within the U.S. where Predator drones are used by Customs and Border Patrol along the borders with Mexico and Canada. And at the end of 2011, U.S. police in North Dakota made their first arrest with the aid of a Predator drone. This type of police surveillance is set to increase after the recent passage of The Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act in 2012.

This expansion feeds into a wider drone “arms race” across the globe. In 2012 the Government Accountability Office revealed that over 75 countries have now acquired some form of drone, with the U.S. and Israel remaining the global export leaders.

Perhaps the emergence of drone-on-drone warfare is just around the corner; after all, there is no shortage of political will, nor is there a shortage of non-state actors that will redefine the rules of the game. Second, in the hunt for affiliates in FATA, the CIA’s drone strikes continue to alienate the larger Pakistani population127. Tom Engelhardt describes drones as “blowback weapons” with Nick Turse adding: “Over the last decade, a more-is-better mentality has led to increased numbers of drones, drone bases, drone pilots, and drone victims, but not much else. Drones may be effective in terms of generating body counts, but they appear to be even more successful in generating animosity and creating enemies”128. Even if al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have indeed “metastasized” across Africa, moving from the tribal areas of Pakistan to new fronts in Somalia, Yemen, and the Sahel, this geographic shift must be seen as the inevitable outcome of an expanding Predator Empire. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst and Obama counterterrorism adviser was blunt in his diagnosis of targeted killings: “The problem with the drone is it’s like your lawn mower. You’ve got to mow the lawn all the time. The minute you stop mowing, the grass is going to grow back”129. But perhaps this is the very point: blowback sustains a permanent war.

Third, the Predator Empire will continue to violate national sovereignty on a number of fronts, as the technology challenges the very sanctity of territory 130. Indeed, it is difficult to keep track of an expanding battlespace spreads horizontally across Africa, and vertically into the earth's upper atmospheres. Furthermore, the drone war appears to be in direct contravention of international humanitarian law on numerous fronts131. U.S. strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya have all taken place in the shadow of law, and set a dangerous precedent that will no doubt be emulated across the globe by a range of state and non-state actors. Indeed, the legal violations of the Predator Empire are mirrored in its territorial violations: both are locked together in a legal-lethal space132. Perhaps the significance held by ground bases, such as Camp Lemonnier, will begin to erode as aircraft carriers enjoy a renewed importance as the Predator Empire migrates along the Pacific Ocean towards China133. Drones are under development by the U.S. Navy that can take off and land autonomously from a carrier. This, combined with increasing developments in “swarm” technology, as well as an escalation of Special Operations forces, sets the stage for a world in which a highly mobile force, answerable only to the executive branch, can drop down from the sky at a minute’s notice—sometimes with a kick at the door, other times with a Hellfire.

While the Predator Empire may be assembled with dozens rather than hundreds of flight orbits, it is essential that the wholesale psychological damage that is being wrought upon thousands of people is never eclipsed by a technological enframing that so often shields the unbearable humanity of it all. Targeted killings are quickly becoming a “post-political” background issue and a noise that few listen to. This is why the civilian voices from Pakistan and elsewhere need to be heard, since they signify the fundamental "worldly" damage caused by drone strikes, well beyond the "surgical" metaphors that circulate in official state narratives. Indeed, Washington’s permanent war is not even an ethical issue for most of the public: it is simply “common sense” to use Predators to solve problems. An intervention is therefore needed to reposition what counts as human security away from this entrenched logic of “death-as-success".

#### The devils are in the details --- understanding details about policy is critical for us to better debate about the implications of unaccountable profiling and introduction of violence --- it can help us create a community of acknowledgement which is key

Hughes 2012 (Evin, Georgia Southern Univ. [Float Like a Plane, Sting Like a Bomb: The Ethics of US Drone Attacks](http://nmcenter.org/attachments/awards_pieces/19/The_Ethics_of_US_Drone_Attacks.docx) [www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/About/Awards/.../Hughes\_Evin.pdf](http://www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/About/Awards/.../Hughes_Evin.pdf). edited for gendered/able-ist language)

What Ali was able to do through his nonviolent rhetoric that is still relevant to this day was successfully make millions of people “bear witness” to the violence and irrationality of war. For example, say you are watching the news with a roommate and the news anchor, within her nicely lit and air conditioned studio, talks in a monotone about the deaths of civilians in a Pakistani market by a drone strike, and your roommate immediately changes the channel, not giving the terrible story another thought. Your roommate doesn’t understand the gravity of that devastation any more than the news anchor does; neither understands the significant socio-economical problems that the drone strike has caused in that area. How about the [person] sitting behind the joystick, the Nintendo-war-controller, pressing the buttons to release the Hellfire missiles like Mario firing at Bowser? Though the drone operator of all people probably knows the extent of the devastation [they are] causing, [they refuse] to think about it, [they hide] the truth from [them]selves. The drone “pilot,” the unenthusiastic anchor, your roommate—they are all complicit. Shoshana Felman, influential in raising issues connected with Holocaust testimony and what is called the “crisis of witnessing,” says that those that misunderstand or hide what they see are unable to take that information and “translate…[it]…spontaneously and simultaneously into meaning” (Felman 212). Famous psychologists Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan described this as disavowal—a defense mechanism in which a person refuses to recognize the reality of a traumatic perception (Evans 44). Through speeches recited on college campuses, Ali urged thousands of students to bear witness to the problems of integration and segregation, hate, and the Vietnam War. In one such speech, he links the violence in Vietnam caused by the war to the violence in the states; he stated that he would rather fight what was going on in a legal way. Not by war in a foreign country, but by nonviolent resistance right here in the United States. “Whatever the punishment, whatever the persecution is for standing up for my beliefs, even if it means facing machine-gun fire that day, I’ll face it…” (Hauser 187). Through 6 this speech, Ali led as example to all those students in the crowd, to all those seeing and not choosing to accept reality, to all those in disavowal. What Felman proposes is a community of [acknowledgement] ~~seeing~~: a space into which “we can bring into consciousness what is unconscious in us”—like the college auditoriums and classrooms where Ali conducted his speeches—to analyze and make sense of events as a community (Amy 67). It is the very nature of the violence of the “war on terror” that does not allow a community of [acknowledgement] ~~seeing~~. The media-attack on these countries by ingratiating news anchors take the American people and place them onto a platform where they are unable to reach a community of seeing, unable to argue the ethics of this war. We are divided, separated from the truth. Democratic representatives John Conyers, Dennis Kuncinich and many more, were calling for a truth as a community of officials when they wrote letters to the president demanding for him to publicly release the criteria on which be would elect people to be attacked by drones on his infamous kill list (Heuvel)—there has been no more coverage of the letters in the media. Unless we become conscious as a community of the truth of the violence we are creating, unless we bear witness and develop a community of [acknowledgement] ~~seeing~~, we are doomed to be “locked into violences we cannot escape” (Amy 69).

#### The refusal to deliberate over drone policy risks public apathy because of the invisible nature of drone warfare ---- the affirmative brings an opportunity to re-engage the public to challenge presidential action

Druck 2012 [Judah A. Druck, law associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Cornell Law School graduate, magna cum laude graduate from Brandeis University, “Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf>]

The practical effects of this move toward a technology-driven, and¶ therefore limited, proxy style of warfare are mixed. On the one hand,¶ the removal of American soldiers from harm’s way is a clear benefit,124¶ as is the reduced harm to the American public in general. For that,¶ we should be thankful. But there is another effect that is less easy to¶ identify: public apathy. By increasing the use of robotics and decreasing the probability of harm to American soldiers, modern warfare has¶ “affect[ed] the way the public views and perceives war” by turning it¶ into “the equivalent of sports fans watching war, rather than citizens¶ sharing in its importance.”125 As a result, the American public has¶ slowly fallen victim to the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare; when the risks of harm to American soldiers abroad and civilians¶ at home are diminished, so too is the public’s level of interest in foreign military policy.126¶ In the political sphere, this effect snowballs into both an uncaring¶ public not able (or willing) to effectively mobilize in order to challenge presidential action and enforce the WPR, and a Congress whose¶ own willingness to check presidential military action is heavily tied to¶ public opinion.127 Recall, for example, the case of the Mayaguez,¶ where potentially unconstitutional action went unchecked because¶ the mission was perceived to be a success.128 Yet we can imagine that¶ most missions involving drone strikes will be “successful” in the eyes of the public: even if a strike misses a target, the only “loss” one needs to¶ worry about is the cost of a wasted missile, and the ease of deploying¶ another drone would likely provide a quick remedy. Given the political risks associated with making critical statements about military action, especially if that action results in success,129 we can expect even¶ less congressional WPR enforcement as more military engagements¶ are supported (or, at the very least, ignored) by the public. In this¶ respect, the political reaction to the Mayaguez seems to provide an example of the rule, rather than the exception, in gauging political reactions within a technology-driven warfare regime.¶ Thus, when the public becomes more apathetic about foreign affairs as a result of the limited harms associated with technology-driven¶ warfare, and Congress’s incentive to act consequently diminishes, the¶ President is freed from any possible WPR constraints we might expect¶ him to face, regardless of any potential legal issues.130 Perhaps unsurprisingly, nearly all of the constitutionally problematic conflicts carried out by presidents involved smaller-scale military actions, rarely¶ totaling more than a few thousand troops in direct contact with hostile forces.131 Conversely, conflicts that have included larger forces,¶ which likely provided sufficient incentive for public scrutiny, have¶ generally complied with domestic law.132¶ The result is that as wars become more limited,133 unilateral presidential action will likely become even more unchecked as the triggers¶ for WPR enforcement fade away. In contrast with the social and political backlash witnessed during the Civil War, World War I, the Vietnam¶ War, and the Iraq War, contemporary military actions provide insufficient incentive to prevent something as innocuous and limited as a¶ drone strike. Simply put, technology-driven warfare is not conducive¶ to the formation of a substantial check on presidential action.134

#### Engaging in the political sciences to create solutions for drones helps us learn about the details and clarifies the solutions necessary

Omar Bashir writes on “How to Improve the Drones Debate” in 2012 (Omar, Princeton PhD candidate. How to Improve the Drones Debate http://themonkeycage.org/2012/11/15/how-to-improve-the-drones-debate/)

Most news articles about drones cover some new development, claim to raise new ethical questions, and mention superficially the need for greater transparency and/or accountability. Specific recommendations for change are rare or rarely helpful ([this](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-drone-war-demands-accountability/2012/11/01/56627964-2380-11e2-8448-81b1ce7d6978_story_1.html) recent editorial calls for strikes to be subject to congressional review, but they [already are](http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/25/nation/la-na-drone-oversight-20120625)). There may be an opportunity for political scientists to contribute by formulating and floating ideas about safeguards that address pressing ethical concerns. For example, it is common to hear calls for the introduction of oversight to drone campaigns. Political scientists generally have a good sense of which proposed institutional arrangements might provide successful oversight because we are trained to consider issues like incentive compatibility. Further, we’re likely to have knowledge of oversight institutions at work in other countries that might be emulated. My own [proposal](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138141/omar-s-bashir/who-watches-the-drones) is based on adaptation of the UK’s system of independent review for terrorism legislation. I think it addresses the single most important ethical issue regarding drone strikes: we have no way of knowing whether or not the U.S. government is acting in accordance with the requirements of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality. Inconsistent studies of post-strike damage have not settled the issue, and we can’t simply take the Obama administration at its word. Instead, the government needs something beyond existing congressional review to demonstrate credibly to audiences at home and abroad that too many civilians are not dying compared to the threat posed by targets and to show that there is appropriate cause for deeming individuals targetable. This oversight, which can ideally provide some indication when strikes begin to violate the requirement of proportionality, may be the key to preventing “endless war”: it might help us know when, if not already, campaigns have taken out so many targets that further killing cannot be justified. Clinton Watts and Frank Cilluffo propose another tangible solution that has a chance of being acceptable both to government and human rights advocates. Their idea is based on the modification of an existing American institution, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court; it is covered in [this](http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=813) post. If you are aware of other proposals, please link them in the comments, and feel free to post your own ideas.

#### Debating about the intricacies about drone policy is that first step

Ishaan Tharoor writes about “The Debate on Drones” in 2013 that (Ishaan, writer for Times. The Debate on Drones: Away from the Politics, the Nameless Dead Remain Read more: <http://world.time.com/2013/02/08/the-debate-on-drones-away-from-the-politics-the-nameless-dead-remain/#ixzz2c3KKvqQS>)

What complicates those hundreds of civilian deaths is the official [refusal to acknowledge] ~~silence~~ that surrounds them. The U.S. government has so far refused to publicly recognize its culpability in what are clandestine missions away from the Afghan theater of operations, while its Pakistani counterparts, who to an extent allowed and abetted the CIA’s drone program, would rather not own up to their own tacit role in supporting many of the strikes. “Both sides are trapped in their own double-dealing,” writes Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid in his new book, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. “The Americans cannot discuss drones, because they are a classified CIA operation, while Pakistan pretends it never sanctioned the drones or provided intelligence to the United States, for fear of riling up the militants.” The awkward geopolitical pas de deux leaves the victims of drone strikes and their families in the dark. Some rights groups and activists have already started collecting testimony from villagers in places like North and South Waziristan. The aforementioned London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism announced Thursday [a project to determine the names](http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/02/04/naming-the-dead-bureau-announces-new-drones-project/) of as many of the reported fatalities of drone strikes in Pakistan as possible. The endeavor will be a difficult one, not least because it will require prying information out of U.S. and Pakistani officials. “In the face of official secrecy, having the full facts about who is killed is essential for an informed debate about the effectiveness and ethics of the drone campaign,” said Christopher Hird, managing editor of the Bureau, in a statement posted on its website. [An editorial](http://dawn.com/2013/02/07/not-credible-enough/) the same day in the prominent Pakistani daily Dawn, concurred: “More information is needed to convince both Americans and Pakistanis that their civil liberties are not being eroded in the name of their security.” The more we learn about drones, the more we should know about who they kill.